A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game by Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier et al.
A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment
game
F. Javier Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niza,∗, Carles Rafelsa, Neus Ybernb
aDept. de Matema`tica Econo`mica, Financera i Actuarial
Universitat de Barcelona
Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
bDept. de Matema`tica Aplicada IV
Escola Polite`cnica Superior d’Enginyeria
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
Av. Vı´ctor Balaguer 1, 08800 Vilanova i la Geltru´, Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
The assignment game [6] is a model for a two-sided market where there is
an exchange of indivisible goods for money and buyers or sellers demand
or supply exactly one unit of the good. We give a procedure to compute
the nucleolus of any assignment game, based on the distribution of equal
amounts to the agents, until the game is reduced to less agents.
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1. Introduction
The main solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. Its
importance relies on the fact that any proposal of allocation within the core
has certain stability since no subgroup of players can do better by splitting
off. In case the core is large we can select an allocation in it. For assignment
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games, the core is always nonempty, and other well-known solutions, such as
the Shapley value [5] are not usually in the core. The nucleolus [4] occupies
a central position inside it, and has outstanding normative properties. In
this paper we study how to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game,
by giving the players in an egalitarian way certain amounts following a well-
defined pace.
Assignment games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik [6] and de-
scribe bilateral markets, formed by a set of buyers, a set of sellers, and for
every buyer and seller, a non-negative real number which is the potential
profit obtained by them if they trade. The worth of any coalition is defined
as the maximum profit obtained by matching buyers to sellers within the
coalition, and an optimal matching of the market gives the maximum profit
that the agents can obtain.
The core is defined as the set of allocations of the worth of the grand
coalition such that no subcoalition can further improve upon. The nucleolus
[4] is the unique core element that lexicographically minimizes the vector
of non-increasingly ordered excesses of coalitions. For assignment games
Solymosi and Raghavan [7] provide an algorithm that computes the nucleolus
of an arbitrary assignment game. Recently Llerena and Nu´n˜ez [1] have
characterized the nucleolus of a square assignment game from a geometric
point of view, using the fact that the nucleolus is the midpoint for some
specific segments inside the core. We use this geometric characterization to
give a procedure to compute the nucleolus of an arbitrary square assignment
game.
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2. Preliminaries
An assignment market (M,M ′, A) is defined to be two disjoint finite sets:
M, the set of buyers, and M ′, the set of sellers and a nonnegative matrix
A = (aij)i∈M,j∈M ′ which represents the profit obtained by each mixed-pair
(i, j) ∈ M ×M ′. To distinguish the j-th seller from the j-th buyer we will
write the former as j′ when needed. Let us assume there are |M | = m buyers
and |M ′| = m′ sellers. The assignment market is called square whenever
|M | = |M ′| .
A matching µ ⊆ M ×M ′ between M and M ′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆
M to M ′0 ⊆ M ′ such that |M0| = |M ′0| = min {|M | , |M ′|} . We write
(i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 (j). If for some buyer i ∈ M
there is no j ∈ M ′ such that (i, j) ∈ µ we say that i is unmatched by
µ and similarly for sellers. The set of all matchings from M to M ′ is
represented by M (M,M ′) . A matching µ ∈ M (M,M ′) is optimal for
(M,M ′, A) if
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij for any µ
′ ∈ M (M,M ′) . We de-
note by M∗A (M,M ′) the set of all optimal matchings. [6] associate any
assignment market with a game in coalitional form (M ∪M ′, wA) called the
assignment game where the worth of a coalition formed by S ⊆ M and
T ⊆ M ′ is wA (S ∪ T ) = max
µ∈M(S,T )
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij , and any coalition formed
only by buyers or only by sellers gets zero.
The core of the assignment game, C(wA), is defined as those allocations
(u, v) ∈ RM × RM ′ satisfying u (M) + v (M ′) = wA (M ∪M ′) and u (S) +
v (T ) ≥ wA (S ∪ T ) for all S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ where u (S) =
∑
i∈S ui,
v (T ) =
∑
j∈T vj , u (∅) = 0 and v (∅) = 0. It is always nonempty.
Given an optimal matching µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) , the core of the assignment
game can be easily described as the set of non-negative payoff vectors (u, v) ∈
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RM+ × RM
′
+ such that
ui + vj ≥ aij for all i ∈M, j ∈M ′, (1)
ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (2)
and all agents unmatched by µ get a null payoff.
Now we define the nucleolus of an assignment game, taking into ac-
count that its core is always nonempty. Given an allocation in the core,
x ∈ C(wA), define for each coalition S ⊆ M ∪M ′ its excess as e (S, x) :=
wA (S) −
∑
i∈S xi. As it is known (see [7]) that the only coalitions that
matter are the individual and mixed-pair ones, define the vector θ (x) of ex-
cesses of individual and mixed-pair coalitions arranged in a non-increasing
order. Then the nucleolus of the game (M ∪M ′, wA) is the unique alloca-
tion ν (wA) ∈ C(wA) which minimizes θ (x) with respect to the lexicographic
order over the set of core allocations. The lexicographic order ≥lex on Rd, is
defined in the following way: x ≥lex y, where x, y ∈ Rd, if x = y or if there
exists 1 ≤ t ≤ d such that xk = yk for all 1 ≤ k < t and xt > yt.
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez [1] characterize the nucleolus of a square assignment
game from a geometric point of view. The nucleolus is the unique core
allocation that is the midpoint of some well-defined segments inside the
core. To be precise they define the maximum transfer from a coalition to
another coalition. Given any square assignment market (M,M ′, A) , and two
arbitrary coalitions of the same cardinality ∅ 6= S ⊆ M, and ∅ 6= T ⊆ M ′,
with |S| = |T | they define:
δAS,T (u, v) := min
i∈S,j∈M ′\T
{ui, ui + vj − aij} , (3)
δAT,S (u, v) := min
j∈T,i∈M\S
{vj , ui + vj − aij} , (4)
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for any core allocation (u, v) ∈ C (wA).
It is easy to see that expression (3) represents the largest amount that
can be transferred from players in S to players in T with respect to the core
allocation (u, v) while remaining in the core, that is,
δAS,T (u, v) = max
{
ε ≥ 0 | (u− ε1S , v + ε1T ) ∈ C (wA)} ,
where 1S and 1T represent the characteristic vectors (for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} , 1S ∈
Rn is such that 1Si = 1, if i ∈ S, and zero otherwise) associated with coalition
S ⊆M and T ⊆M ′, respectively.
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez [1] prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment
market is characterized as the unique core allocation (u, v) ∈ C(wA) such
that
δAS,T (u, v) = δ
A
T,S (u, v) (5)
for any ∅ 6= S ⊆M and ∅ 6= T ⊆M ′ with |S| = |T |. Notice that if T 6= µ(S)
for some µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) , then δAS,T (u, v) = δAT,S (u, v) = 0. Then, for this
characterization we only check the case T = µ(S) for all optimal matchings.
This is called the bisection property.
3. The procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment
game
In this section we give a procedure to compute the nucleolus of an ar-
bitrary assignment game. The main idea is to distribute some “dividends”
to the players in such a way that we retain an assignment market, whose
nucleolus gives the remaining worth to the agents. In it, we lower the entries
in the matrix, until at least one optimal entry of some optimal matching is
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set to zero. Players involved in these entries will not receive any more div-
idends. In this way we associate a new game with, at least, one player less
on each side.
If the assignment market is not square, we can add dummy players, i.e.
null rows or columns, and compute its nucleolus. These players get zero at
any core allocation, and in [3] is discussed that making the matrix square
does not modify the nucleolus of the assignment game, if we drop at the end
the null payoff to the added dummy agents. Therefore our procedure also
applies to non-square assignment games.
The procedure we are going to present is based on two propositions.
The first proposition is a direct consequence of the fact that the nucleolus
of assignment games satisfies an adapted reduced game property [2]. It is
stated without proof, because if one entry of some optimal matching is zero,
agents optimally assigned get zero at all points of the core, and thus in the
nucleolus.
Proposition 3.1. Let A ∈ M+m be a square matrix and let µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′)
be an optimal matching such that ak µ(k) = 0 for some k ∈M. Then, matrix
A′ ∈ M+m−1 defined by:
a′ij = max{0, aij − ai µ(k) − akj} for i ∈M \ {k} and j ∈M ′ \ {µ(k)},
satisfies:
νi(wA) =νi(wA′) + ai µ(k) for i ∈M \ {k},
νj(wA) =νj(wA′) + akj for j ∈M ′ \ {µ(k)}, and
νk(wA) =νµ(k)(wA) = 0.
The second proposition states that decreasing all the entries in the as-
signment matrix following a determined pace, we could simplify the compu-
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tation of the nucleolus. The decreasing rate of the matrix entries depends
on whether they are part of an optimal matching or not. If they belong
to optimal matching, the decreasing rate is twice the one corresponding to
the entries that do not belong to an optimal matching. Once an entry has
dropped to zero, it stays to zero.
To this end, we need some notation. Given a square assignment ma-
trix A ∈ M+m we define the set of all entries that belong to some optimal
matching,
HA =
{
(i, j) ∈M ×M ′ | (i, j) belongs to some optimal matching in A} .
Consider now the minimum entry in matrix A that is in some optimal
matching, and define
αA := min
{aij
2
| (i, j) ∈ HA
}
. (6)
On the other hand, for t ≥ 0, we introduce the following matrix At. Its
entries are defined as:
atij =
 max{0, aij − 2t} for (i, j) ∈ HA,max{0, aij − t} for (i, j) /∈ HA. (7)
These entries atij are non-increasing functions of t, and for t = 0, A
0 = A.
Now for each non-optimal matching, µ ∈M (M,M ′)\M∗A (M,M ′) , consider
the following equation, in t ≥ 0 :
fAµ (t) = wA(M ∪M ′)− 2mt−
∑
(i,j)∈µ
atij = 0, (8)
and denote tAµ ≥ 0 its unique solution. To see that this solution exists and
is unique, note that since µ is not optimal, we have that fAµ (0) > 0 be-
cause wA(M ∪M ′) >
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij ; at t = ∞ the left-hand side is negative;
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and function fAµ (t) is continuous, concave and piecewise linear with nega-
tive slope. Notice that if tAµ ≤ αA we know that we will find at least two
matchings in At
A
µ with the same worth. Then define
βA := min
{
tAµ | µ ∈M
(
M,M ′
) \M∗A (M,M ′)} . (9)
Now we are in a position to state our second proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let A ∈ M+m be a square matrix and let αA and βA as in
(6) and (9) Then, for each ε ≤ min{αA, βA}, matrix Aε ∈ M+m defined by
(7) satisfies:
νi(wA) =νi(wAε) + ε for i ∈M,
νj(wA) =νj(wAε) + ε for j ∈M ′.
Proof. Let ν(wAε) = (u, v) be the nucleolus of the game wAε . We must prove
that (u′, v′) = (u, v) + ε(1M , 1M ′) is the nucleolus of wA.
Notice first that if µ∗ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) is an optimal matching for A then
it is an optimal matching for Aε. To see it, notice that since ε ≤ αA, we have∑
(i,j)∈µ∗ a
ε
ij = wA(M ∪M ′)−2mε and since ε ≤ βA, wA(M ∪M ′)−2mε ≥∑
(i,j)∈µ a
ε
ij for all µ ∈M (M,M ′) \M∗A (M,M ′) .
Fix one optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) , and notice that (u′, v′) ∈
C(wA) since for each (i, j) ∈M×M ′ we have u′i+v′j = ui+vj+2ε ≥ aεij+2ε ≥
aij and if (i, j) ∈ µ we have the equality. Now let ∅ 6= S ⊆M be a coalition
of buyers. We compute δAS,µ(S) (u
′, v′) = min
i∈S,j∈M ′\µ(S)
{
u′i, u
′
i + v
′
j − aij
}
,
and we distinguish two cases:
(a) if there exists i ∈ S and j ∈ M ′ \ µ(S) such that (i, j) ∈ HA we have
δAS,µ(S) (u
′, v′) = 0, and δAµ(S),S (u
′, v′) = 0,
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(b) if for all i ∈ S and j ∈M ′ \ µ(S) we have (i, j) /∈ HA we deduce
δAS,µ(S)
(
u′, v′
)
= min
i∈S,j∈M ′\µ(S)
{ui + ε, ui + vj + 2ε− aij}
= ε+ min
i∈S,j∈M ′\µ(S)
{ui, ui + vj − (aij − ε)} (10)
Notice now that, if aij > ε, we have aij − ε = aεij , and if aij ≤ ε, we
have aεij = 0 and ui + vj − (aij − ε) ≥ ui + vj ≥ ui, and thus we can
substitute in (10) expression ui + vj − (aij − ε) by ui + vj − aεij , and
we obtain:
δAS,µ(S)
(
u′, v′
)
= ε+ min
i∈S,j∈M ′\µ(S)
{
ui, ui + vj − aεij
}
= ε+ δA
ε
S,µ(S) (u, v) .
A similar argument proves that δAµ(S),S (u
′, v′) = ε+ δAεµ(S),S (u, v) , and since
(u, v) is the nucleolus of the game wAε , we know that δ
Aε
S,µ(S) (u, v) = δ
Aε
µ(S),S (u, v) .
Therefore it is clear that by (5) we have finished the proof.
Remark 3.1. Notice that, by applying Proposition 3.2, any optimal match-
ing for A remains optimal for Aε for ε ≤ min{αA, βA}. Therefore in each
step, for ε = min{αA, βA}, either we obtain at least one entry of an optimal
matching equal to zero, and/or at least one more optimal matching.
Remark 3.2. If αA < βA we obtain, for ε = αA, that at least one entry in
the optimal matching has been dropped to zero. If αA > βA we obtain, for
ε = βA, that at least we have another optimal matching.
The iterated application of Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 increases
the number of optimal matchings and/or reduces the number of players. In
a finite number of steps we finish the procedure.
We will illustrate the application of the procedure to the non-square
example in [7].
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Example 3.1 (Section 7 in [7]). Consider the following assignment market:
M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′, 4′, 5′}, and matrix
A =

6 7 4 5 9
4 3 7 8 3
0 1 3 6 4
2 2 5 7 8
 .
In the first place, we add a dummy buyer, buyer 5, whose row is filled
with zeroes. The optimal matching is denoted in boldface and by the boxes
around the entries.
Therefore, the square matrix that we begin with is the following one:
A[0] =

6 7 4 5 9
4 3 7 8 3
0 1 3 6 4
2 2 5 7 8
0 0 0 0 0

.
Step 1: Since there is one entry equal to zero in one optimal matching,
a51 = 0, we apply Proposition 3.1, and players 5 and 1’ leave the market.
The new assignment market is M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {2′, 3′, 4′, 5′}
and its matrix is:
A[1] =

1 0 0 3
0 3 4 0
1 3 6 4
0 3 5 6
 .
Recall that a
[1]
ij = max{0, aij − ai1 − a5j}, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and j = 2, 3, 4, 5.
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Step 2: Since there is no entry equal to zero in some optimal matching, we
apply Proposition 3.2, and we distribute the players ε = 12 which is exactly
one half of the minimum entry in the unique optimal matching. In fact, in
this case βA
[1]
= 1 and min{αA[1] , βA[1]} = 12 . The new assignment market
is M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {2′, 3′, 4′, 5′} and its matrix is:
A[2] =

0 0 0 212
0 2 312 0
1
2 2
1
2 5 3
1
2
0 212 4
1
2 5
 .
Notice that the optimal entries reduce their worth by 2 ε = 2 12 = 1, whilst
the non-optimal entries reduce their worth by ε = 12 .
Step 3: Since there is one entry equal to zero in one optimal matching, we
apply Proposition 3.1, and players 1 and 2’ leave the market.
The new assignment market is M = {2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {3′, 4′, 5′} and
its matrix is:
A[3] =

2 312 0
2 412
1
2
212 4
1
2 2
1
2
 .
Step 4: Since there is no entry equal to zero in some optimal matching, we
apply Proposition 3.2, and we must compute the limits in the statement of
the proposition. In this case αA
[3]
= 1 and βA
[3]
= 12 . Players receive
1
2 and
we obtain another optimal matching.
The new assignment market is M = {2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {3′, 4′, 5′} and
its matrix is:
A[4] =

1 3 0
112 3
1
2 0
2 4 112
 .
11
Notice that this matrix has two optimal matchings.
Step 5: Since there is no entry equal to zero in some optimal matching, we
apply Proposition 3.2, obtaining αA
[4]
= 12 and β
A[4] = 16 . Therefore we dis-
tribute 16 to the players and we obtain several additional optimal matchings.
The new assignment market is M = {2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {3′, 4′, 5′} and
its matrix is:
A[5] =

2
3 2
2
3 0
116 3
1
6 0
156 3
5
6 1
1
6
 .
Notice that we have obtained a new matrix with four optimal matchings.
Step 6: Since there is one entry equal to zero in one optimal matching, we
apply Proposition 3.1, and players 2 and 5’ leave the market.
The new assignment market is M = {3, 4} and M ′ = {3′, 4′} and its
matrix is:
A[6] =
 12 12
0 0
 .
Step 7: Since there are two entries equal to zero, one in each optimal
matching, we apply Proposition 3.1, and all remaining players leave the
market.
In Table 3.1, we can see the payments to the agents in each step of the
procedure. The sum of payments for each agent gives the nucleolus of game
wA[0] . The fact that a player is removed and leaves the market is denoted by
a box.
Since buyer 5 is a dummy player, which has been added at the beginning
of the process to make square the original matrix, we can state the nucleolus
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Table 1: The computation of the nucleolus of Example 3.1
Player 1 2 3 4 5 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’
Step 1 6 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Step 2 12
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Step 3 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 2
1
2
Step 4 12
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Step 5 16
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
Step 6 0 0 76
2
3 2
2
3 0
Step 7 12 0 0 0
TOTAL 612 5
1
6 2
1
6 4
1
3 0 0
1
2 1
5
6 3
5
6 3
2
3
of the original example. The nucleolus is:
ν(wA) =
(
6
1
2
, 5
1
6
, 2
1
6
, 4
1
3
; 0,
1
2
, 1
5
6
, 3
5
6
, 3
2
3
)
.
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